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who are within the compensation system immune from any suits
for injuries or death, with, of course, the exception of a deliberate
act on the part of the employer or willful misconduct on the part
of the employee.36 Where the third party tortfeasor is not within
the compensation system, common law indemnity should be modi-
fied to the extent that recovery-over against a negligent employer
would be restricted to that amount for which the employer would
be liable under the compensation act. A legislative amendment or
judicial declaration carrying forth these views would not result in
compulsory compensation coverage. While the system would remain
elective, there would be an added incentive for all employers to
come under the coverage of the act. At the same time, it would put
new vitality into an act which must be adaptable to the changing
times of our society.
At present, three states have adopted a boundary line of com-
pensation system immunity around the entire membership of the
state's compensation family.37 It remains to be seen whether Kentucky
will join the progressive minority and adopt what appears to be the
better view.
Donald K. James
EVIDENCE-PmOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS-COURT BEVERsES LONG
LINE OF DEcisIoNs.-Tex Jett was charged with detaining his sister-
in-law with intent to have carnal knowledge of her.' On the night in
question, Jett, his wife and his sister-in-law were together at the Jett
home. At trial Mrs. Jett testified that she called the police and sum-
moned them to her home because Mr. Jett was drunk and out of
control. The commonwealth's attorney was permitted to call as a
witness the police officer who received Mrs. Jett's phone call. He
testified that Mrs. Jett said her husband was drunk and molesting
her sister. Mr. Jett appealed, objecting to this latter testimony on
the ground that it was hearsay.2 Held: Reversed. When both the
36 See KRS § 342.015(2) & (3).3 7 Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act, Tit. 26, § 312 (formerly § 7587)
(1947); ILL. ANNO. ST., Ch. 48, §§ 139, 166 (Smith-Hurd 1935); REV. CODE OF
WA H. § 7675 (1951); See also 2 LAEsoN § 72.40 for further comment on the effect
of these statutes.
IKentucky's statute defining the crime of having carnal knowledge of a
female is found in Ky. BEv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 435.110 (1942).
2 The trial judge had instructed the jury to use the out-of-court statement
by Mrs. Jett only as affecting the witness' credibility, not substantively for the
truthfulness of its content.
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person who allegedly made the out-of-court statement and the person
asserting that he made it appear as witnesses under oath and subject
to the rigor of cross-examination, there is no reason the jury should
not be permitted to hear as substantive evidence all they both have
to say on the subject in order to determine where the truth lies.
Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969).
The above ruling vitiates two generally accepted rules of evidence
that had been consistently adhered to in Kentucky courts for over a
hundred years. First, prior inconsistent statements of a witness had
previously been admissible only for the purpose of impeaching that
particular witness. These prior inconsistent statements were not
hearsay if limited in purpose to discrediting the witness. They were
hearsay if employed substantively to prove the truthfulness of their
content.3 Second, if an examiner received what the court generically
refers to as a negative response from a witness, he was precluded
from impeaching that witness by his or her own prior inconsistent
statements.- This latter rule originated in the case of Champ v.
Commonwealth5 There an examiner was confronted by a turncoat
witness who denied any knowledge concerning the facts the examiner
expected to illicit from him. The examiner was not permitted to
use a prior out-of-court statement of the witness in which the witness
had claimed knowledge with regard to these facts.6 The rationale
of preventing an examiner from impeaching a witness when that
witness merely fails to respond in the manner desired by the examiner
3 Brown v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 814, 224 S.W. 362 (1920); Whitt v.
Commonwealth, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 50, 84 S.W. 340 (1905). The generally accepted
rule is as follows:
When a witness has changed sides and altered his story or forgets or
claims to forget some fact, and his previous statement is received for
impeachment purposes, what effect shall be given to the statement as
evidence? Under the generally accepted doctrine the statement is not
usable as substantive evidence of the facts stated. The adversary if he so
requests is entitled to an instruction to that effect, and, more important,
if the only evidence of some essential fact is such a previous statement,
the party s case fails. C. McCoRaucK, LAw oF EvmENcE [hereinafter
cited as McCoRMzcx] § 39, at 73 (1954).4 McQueen v. Commonwealth, 393 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1965); Champ v.
Commonwealth, 59 Ky. (2 Mete.) 17 (1859).
559 Ky. (2 Mete.) 17 (1859).6 Id. at 24, where the court states the following:
. . . [W]here a witness states a fact prejudicial to the party calling him,
the latter may be allowed to show that such fact does not exist, by
proving that the witness had made statements to others inconsistent with
= present testimony. But a case like the present, where the witness
does not state any fact prejudicial to the party calling him, but only
fails to prove facts supposed to be beneficial to the party, is not within
the reason of policy of the rule, and the witness can not be contradicted
in such a case by evidence that he had previously stated the same facts
to others....
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is that the jury will necessarily use these out-of-court statements
substantively, instead of for their proper purpose of affecting the
witness' credibility. This follows when the witness responds only
negatively, for example, 'I don't know," or "I don't remember,"
because there is no literal inconsistency in his statements. Therefore,
there is nothing to impeach. As a result, the traditional Kentucky
rule has been to exclude evidence of this nature because its only
possible use is a substantive one, a use prohibited by the hearsay
rule.7
The above limitation on use of out-of-court statements has been
criticized on the basis of the false distinction it draws between
positive and negative responses on the part of a witness." A response
such as, "I don't know," although negative in a very technical sense,
is usually positive or affimative in effect. The witness is now saying
he doesn't know anything about the existence of a particular fact,
while on a previous occasion he stated he did know something about
the existence of that fact. Adherence to this false distinction obviously
tends to exclude potentially relevant evidence. A very typical example
demonstrating this is seen in Miller v. Commonwealth.9 There the
defendant was on trial for murder. The commonwealth's attorney
asked a witness if she had not told the police prior to trial that the
defendant had threatened the deceased. The witness responded,
"No," to the examiner's question. The examiner then called police
officers who testified that the witness had made such statements in
their presence. This was held reversible error because the witness
merely gave a negative response and could not be impeached on
that basis. Another similar example of the strict application of this
rule can be seen in the case of McQueen v. Commonwealth.10 There
7 This limitation on impeachment of witnesses, i.e., limiting the use of prior
inconsistent statements to situations where the witness responds in a positive
manner, has existed in Kentucky despite the presence of Ky. B. Civ. P. 43.7
(1963), which states:
A witness may be impeached by any party, without regard to which
party produced him, by contradictory evidence, [and] by showing that
he had made statements different from his present testimony....
847 Ky. L.J. 253 (1959). The author advocates that an examiner should
at least be permitted to use the prior inconsistent statements of a turncoat or
negatively responding witness where he is genuinely surprised by the witness'
answer.
9241 Ky. 818, 45 S.W.2d 461 (1932).
10 393 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1965).
... [T]his court recognized the rule that a party may impeach its own
witness, by proof of contradictory statements, only where the witness
testifies positively to the existence of a fact prejudicial to the party, and
not where the witness merely fails or refuses to testify as to the existence
of a fact that would be favorable to the party.... The rule has been
followed consistently. Id. at 791
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the defendant was charged with manslaughter. The prosecution
called a witness and asked if the witness had seen a weapon in
the possession of the defendant. The witness responded he had not.
The prosecution then brought in prior statements made by the witness
to the police in which he said he had seen such a weapon in the
possession of the defendant. Again the Court of Appeals held this
to be reversible error because the prosecutor could not impeach a
witness where the witness gave only a negative response. Since the
out-of-court statement could not be used for impeachment, its only
possible use was substantive. If used substantively, it violated the
hearsay rule and hence should be excluded.11
The fear that impeachment testimony will be used in a substantive
manner is justified. It does seem that the average juror would have
difficulty in drawing the fine distinction between the use of out-of-
court statements to affect a witness' credibility and the use of such
statements substantively. As the court pointed out in Jet-t, many
attorneys no doubt have recognized the artificiality of this distinction.12
They have, under the guise of impeaching a witness' credibility,
succeeded in having out-of-court statements admitted into evidence,
knowing full well the jury would use these statements in a substantive
manner. A number of distinguished jurists have advocated that this
artificial distinction be abandoned.'8 Professor Wigmore in his treatise
says the purpose of the hearsay rule is not to exclude all out-of-court
statements by a witness, but merely to exclude such statements when
the witness may not be cross-examined concerning them.' 4 As a
result, he proposes that where a witness is in court and the statement
is written, substantive use should be permitted. He also proposes that
such statements be used substantively where both the witness and
the person who heard the statement are in court. The policy of the
hearsay rule is not violated in these two instances because the state-
ments in both can readily be subjected to cross-examination.' 5 The
1 McCoiNC= § 39; 3 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE [hereinafter
cited as WIMORE] § 1018, at 687, 690 (3rd ed. 1940).
12436 S.W.2d at 791 (Ky. 1969).
13 A list of scholars advocating abolishment of this distinction is found at 5
WxiaoBE § 1362, at 3-8.
14 3 WiMozu § 1018, at 687-90.
15 As Professor Wigmore explains:
It does not follow, however, that Prior-Self-Contradictions when ad-
mitted, are to be treated as having no affirmative testimonial value, and
that any such credit is to be strictly denied them in the mind of the
tribunal. The only ground for doing so would be the Hearsay Rule. But
the theory of the Hearsay Rule is that an extra-judicial statement is re-jected because it was not subject to cross-examination. Here, however,
by hypothesis the witness is present and subject to cross-examination.
(Continued on next page)
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Model Code of Evidence 6 and the Uniform Rules of Evidencel7 have
both adopted this view on the use of out-of-court statements. This
more liberal view has also been substantially adhered to by the
draftsmen of the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for
the United States District Courts and Magistrates.18
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in the Jett case has substantially
adopted what appears to be the better view on the use of out-of-
court statements. The decision in Jett has two meaningful ramifica-
tions. First, the semantic distinction between a negative and positive
response on the part of a witness is abolished. As a result, an examiner
may readily impeach a turncoat or recalcitrant witness with his
prior statements. Second, and most significantly, the decision permits
the use of out-of-court statements in a substantive manner when the
witness who made or heard the statements is in court as a witness,
thus subject to cross-examination. The Jett decision recognizes that
the hearsay rule excludes out-of-court statements only because they
cannot be subjected to the rigor of cross-examination. Where there
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
There is ample opportunity to test him as to the basis of his former
statement. The whole purpose of the Hearsay Rule has already been
satisfied.... The contrary view, however, is the orthodox one. It is
universally maintained by the courts that Prior-Self-Contradictions are
not to be treated as having any substantive or independent testimonial
value. (Emphasis added.) Id.1 6 MODEL CODE OF Evm-.NcE rule 503 (1942):
Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that
the declarant:
* * 0 0
(b) is present and subject to cross-examination.
17 UmroRm RuruS OF EvmENcz rule 63 (1953):
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated
is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except:
o* * *
(1) Previous statements of persons present and subject to cross-examina-
tion. A statement previously made by a person who is present at the
hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the statement
and its subject matter, provided the statement would be admissible if
made by declarant while testifying as a witness....
18 PrxmvNARY DRA_.r OF PROPOSED RULEs OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNnED
STATES Dssmcr CouRTs AND MAGISTRATES rule 8.01 (C) (2)
Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted unless:
a 0 * *
(2) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at trial or hear-
ing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement (i) is
inconsistent with his testimony....
It should be noted that the above rule defines hearsay in such a manner so as to
exclude prior inconsistent statements when the witness is subject to cross-
examination. The other liberal views as mentioned previously accomplished the
same effect by "excepting" these statements from the operation of the hearsay rule.
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is opportunity to cross-examine these statements, there is simply no
purpose in excluding them as substantive proof provided they meet
the other criteria for admissibility.
loel V. Williamson
TORTS-NEGLIGENc-DuTY TO WAm iN PRODUCT LIABILIY CASES-
Wilbur Post was injured when the fan of an industrial vacuum
cleaner, designed for 115 AC voltage, disintegrated as the result of
his plugging it into an outlet supplying 220 DC voltage. The equip-
ment was furnished to Post's employer by an out of state corporation'
through a local distributor. Written instructions accompanying the
machine warned the user that serious damage to both machine and
operator might result from use of the wrong voltage. The manu-
facturer had included a 21/2" x 11" decal bearing the inscription
"ONLY USE ON 115 VOLTS AC OR DC" for attachment to the
equipment. In addition, it had affixed a metal plate to the vacuum
bearing the serial number of the machine and the words "VOLTS
115" The plate had been mentioned in the written instructions.
Under an instruction which made no reference to a duty to warn
and contained no definition of an adequate warning, the jury found
in favor of the manufacturer. Post appealed. Held: Reversed. The
judge should have instructed the jury that there was a duty to give
an adequate warning to all foreseeable users. Post v. American Clean-
ing Equipment Corporation, 437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1968).
Manufacturer's liability for product-caused injuries may be based
on contract or tort law. In the latter, actions are predicated on either
negligence or strict liability. Within specific areas of product liability
such as product design and the duty to warn, negligence still remains
the prevalent theory of liability.2 Recently, however, there have been
a few cases applying strict liability for a failure to provide an adequate
warning to the user.3
3 The Court discusses the jurisdiction question and Kentucky's "doing busi-
ness" statute, Ky. Bxv. STAT. § 271.610(2) (1946), and rules that the concept of
"doing business," as discussed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), is no longer applicable in product liability cases where the doctrine
of strict liability has been adopted. The Court cites Annot., 19 A.L.R. 3d 13 as
authority. Note that the Court is implying that Post is a strict liability case.2 Note, Foreseeability in Product Design & Duty to Warn Cases-Distinctions
. Misconceptions, 68 Wis. L. ER-v. 228 (1968).
3 See e.g., Canifax v. Hercules Power Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr.
552 (1965).
1969]
